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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—PATENTS:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES THE
TEST FOR PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF PROCESSES
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)
ABSTRACT
In Bilski v. Kappos, the United States Supreme Court clarified the
threshold test of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, holding the machine-or-transformation test was not the sole test to determine whether a
process invention was eligible for patent. The machine-or-transformation
test is an important and useful clue in determining whether a process invention is patent eligible, but should not be used as a bright-line test. The
Court interpreted the statutory language of “process” with its ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning, which did not require a tie to a machine
or transformation of an article, and the Court thus concluded the machineor-transformation test could not be the sole test of patent eligibility for
processes.
The Court further held 35 U.S.C. § 101 similarly did not preclude
business methods from being patent eligible as processes. Because
“method” may include methods of doing business—as there is no ordinary,
contemporary, and common meaning of “method” that excludes business
methods—and federal law explicitly contemplates the existence of some
business method patents in a defense to patent infringement within 35
U.S.C. § 273(b)(1), business methods are not precluded under § 101 from
patent eligibility. Nonetheless, the Court concluded the claimed invention
was not patent eligible because it was an abstract idea. Bilski attempted to
bring clarity to the determination of patent eligibility for processes, but the
decision may have made the patent eligibility determination more nebulous.
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FACTS

Bernard Bilski and Rand Warsaw developed a method of hedging the
consumption risk associated with selling a commodity at a fixed price for a
given period.1 Bilski and Warsaw’s method of hedging was particularly
useful with energy commodities such as natural gas, electricity, and coal because the method included ways to compensate for weather conditions.2
For example, Bilski and Warsaw’s hedging method can be illustrated with

1. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010). See also Brief for Petitioners at 3, Bilski,
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964) (explaining the developed method of hedging).
2. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 3.
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the relationship of coal power plants and coal mining companies.3 Coal
power plants purchase coal to produce electricity and are opposed to an
increase in demand for coal because such an increase would affect costs.4
Coal mining companies are averse to a sudden drop in demand for coal
because such a drop would reduce sales and depress prices.5 The method of
hedging developed by Bilski and Warsaw placed an intermediary to sell
coal to power plants at a fixed price and purchase coal from mining
companies at a second fixed price.6 Both coal power plants and mining
companies are isolated and protected against risk of price fluctuation while
the intermediary commodity provider has hedged its risk.7 If demand and
price spike, the intermediary has sold coal at a disadvantageous price but
has bought coal at an advantageous price, and vice versa if demand and
price fall.8 Bilski and Warsaw’s hedging method was not limited to actual
commodities and was applicable beyond the energy market.9
Bilski and Warsaw filed an application to patent the hedging method
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on April 10,
1997.10 The patent application included eleven claims describing the
hedging method; claims one and four were prominent.11 Claim one
3. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 949-50. The process for fixing prices is not a simple process. Brief for Petitioners,
supra note 1, at 3-4. Under the hedging method, fixed bill prices, accounting for weather
fluctuations, are determined as follows:
Fixed Bill Price = Fi + [(Ci +Ti +LDi) x ( + E(W1))] Wherein,
Fi = fixed costs in period i;
Ci = variable commodity costs in period i;
Ti = variable long distance transportation costs in period i;
LDi = variable local delivery cost in period i;
In this equations,
+ E(W1) represents the approximation of the amount of
consumption driven by the weather, which is estimated with a least squares statistical
model based on historical averages.
Id.
7. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see also Energy Risk Management Method Patent Application 08/833,892.
11. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010). Claim one of the patent application,
describing the determination of the fixed price for an energy consumer, stated:
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at
a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a
risk position of said consumer;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk
position to said consumers; and
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described a series of steps instructing for hedging risk, and claim four articulated the concept of claim one as a mathematical formula.12 The USPTO
examiner rejected the patent application because “the [hedging method] is
not implemented on a specific apparatus and merely manipulates an abstract
idea and solves a purely mathematical problem without any limitation to a
practical application, therefore, the invention is not directed to the technological arts.”13 The USPTO examiner further explained the method was an
abstract idea, a mathematical algorithm that did not fall within the technological arts.14
Bilski and Warsaw appealed the examiner’s rejection for patent protection to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board).15 On appeal,
Bilski and Warsaw argued there was no requirement, or statute that specified, a specific apparatus upon which the method must be performed or that
a specific apparatus be specified when claiming a method.16 The Board
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said
market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market
participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer
transactions.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 7. Claim four of the patent application, describing the
mathematical formula to derive claim one, stated:
A method for managing weather-related energy price risk costs sold by an energy provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said energy provider and energy
consumers wherein said energy consumers purchase energy at a fixed rate based
upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said
consumers, wherein the fixed price for the consumer transaction is determined
by the relationship:
Fixed Bill Price = Fi + [(Ci +Ti +LDi) x ( + E(W1))] Wherein,
Fi = fixed costs in period i;
Ci = variable costs in period i;
Ti = variable long distance transportation costs in period i;
LDi = variable local delivery cost in period i;
E(W1) = estimated location-specific weather indicators in period i;
and and are constants;
(b) identifying other energy market participants having a counter-risk position to
said consumers; and
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said energy provider and said other
energy market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of
transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer transactions.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 8.
12. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223. The remaining claims explained how claims one and four
could be applied to reduce the risk associated with market fluctuation for energy suppliers and
consumers. Id. at 3224. The Court focused on claims one and four because the remaining claims
were dependent on the patent eligibility of these two claims. Id.
13. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, at *3 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26,
2006).
14. Id.
15. Id. at *1.
16. Id. at *64.
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responded by acknowledging there was no requirement of process claims to
recite the means for performing the steps, but concluded “the absence of
any apparatus in [the] claims is evidence that [they] do not transform physical subject matter as a machine inherently would, and do not recite practical
application of the ‘abstract idea.’”17 Bilski and Warsaw further argued the
hedging method was patentable because it produced a “useful, concrete, and
tangible result.”18 The Board rejected the argument and ultimately affirmed
the decision of the USPTO examiner, holding transformation of “nonphysical financial risks and legal liabilities of the commodity provider, the
consumer, and the market participants” were non-statutory subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.19 The Board also held Bilski and Warsaw’s claim
“preempts any and every possible way of performing the steps of the
[claimed process], by human or any kind of machine or by any combination
thereof,” and thus was an abstract idea and not patent eligible.20
Bilski and Warsaw appealed the decision of the Board to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.21 After oral arguments on
October 1, 2007, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, on its own accord,
granted a hearing en banc.22 In In re Bilski,23 the court of appeals affirmed
17. Id.
18. Id. at *71. Bilski and Warsaw relied on State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group when arguing the hedging method produced a useful, concrete, and tangible
result. Id. The Board rejected the argument because the holding in State Street Bank & Trust was
limited to transformation of data by a machine. Id. at *72; see also infra note 165 and accompanying test (discussing Justice Breyer’s view the Court properly rejected the notion anything that
produced a useful, concrete, and tangible result was eligible for patent protection).
19. Id. at *52-53. In a concurring opinion, Administrative Patent Judge McQuade noted
“[t]he quest for a bright line test for determining whether a claimed invention embodies statutory
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is an exercise in futility.” Id. at *80. Judge McQuade advocated that determination of statutory subject matter under § 101 should focus on the claim as a
whole, not the specific category—such as process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter—to which the claim belongs. Id. at *81. This advancement thus supported an assessment
of statutory subject matter on a case-by-case basis. Id. An examination of Bilski and Warsaw’s
hedging method, with claim one at the core, “disembodied [a] business concept representing nothing more than a non-statutory abstract idea . . . and merely serve to superficially couch the appellants’ abstract idea in a method or process format.” Id. at *85.
20. Id. at *56.
21. In re Bilski, 264 F. App’x. 896, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
22. Id. at 897. The court requested supplemental briefs by the parties to address the
following questions:
(1) Whether claim 1 of the . . . patent application claims patent-eligible subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. §101?
(2) What standard should govern in determining whether a process is patent-eligible
subject matter under section 101?
(3) Whether the claimed subject matter is not patent-eligible because it constitutes an
abstract idea or mental process; when does a claim that contains both mental and
physical steps create patent-eligible subject matter?
(4) Whether a method or process must result in a physical transformation of an article
or be tied to a machine to be patent-eligible subject matter under section 101?
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24

the judgment of the Board. On appeal, Bilski and Warsaw argued: (1)
claim one of their patent application produced a useful, concrete, and tangible result, making it patent eligible under § 101, and (2) the “claimed process does not comprise only ‘steps that are totally or substantially practiced
in the mind but clearly require physical activity which have a tangible
result.’”25 The court of appeals rejected Bilski and Warsaw’s arguments,
stating the correct analysis was whether the claims met the requirements of
the machine-or-transformation test, not whether “physical steps” were involved in the claimed process.26 The court of appeals articulated the definitive test to determine “whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough
to encompass only a particular application of a fundamental principle rather
than to pre-empt the principle itself” to be the machine-or-transformation
test.27 Under this test, a claimed process is patent eligible under § 101 if:
“(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) if it transforms a
particular article into a different state or thing.”28 The court of appeals
affirmed the Board’s decision and held Bilski and Warsaw’s hedging
method did not transform any article to a different state or thing, but simply
manipulated legal obligations, business risks, and other abstractions.29
Because the method of hedging, as claimed, did not limit any step to a
particular machine or apparatus and did not utilize transformation, the court
of appeals held the claim failed the machine-or-transformation test and was
thus not patent eligible under § 101.30

(5) Whether it is appropriate to reconsider State Street & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999), in this case and, if so, whether
those cases should be overruled in any respect?
Id.
23. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
24. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 966.
25. Id. at 964.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 954.
28. Id. The court based the patent eligibility test for processes on: Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 192 (1981) (holding the use of a mathematical formula in process transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing constitutes patent-eligible subject matter); Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978) (noting the “Court has only recognized a process as within
the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change
materials to a different state or thing”); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (“Transformation and reduction of an article, to a different state or thing, is the clue to the patentability of a
process claim that does not include particular machines.”); and Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780,
788 (1876) (“A process is . . . an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”).
29. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963.
30. Id. at 964.
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Bilski and Warsaw filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the
United States Supreme Court granted.31 The Supreme Court held the court
of appeals incorrectly determined the machine-or-transformation test to be
the sole test of patent eligibility of a process under § 101.32 Further, the
Court held business methods, such as Bilski and Warsaw’s hedging method,
are not categorically excluded as patent eligible processes.33 Nonetheless,
the Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding the hedging
process at issue was not patent eligible because it was an attempt to patent
the use of abstract ideas.34
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos35
articulated three distinct characteristics of patent eligibility for processes
36
under § 101.
First, the test for determining patent eligibility of
“processes” under § 101 is not solely the machine-or-transformation test.37
Second, the term “process” in § 101 does not categorically exclude business
methods.38 Third, abstract ideas are not patent eligible.39 The determination of patent eligibility is a threshold question that must be answered
before any other aspects of the patent approval process can commence.40
A. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The patent system in the United States antedates the founding of the
country because the American colonies imported patent tradition from
English law.41 Since the import of the English patent system to the United
States, some features of the English system have been maintained while
others have disappeared.42 The foundational beginning of the American
patent system, and differentiation from English patent law, began with a
Constitutional provision.43
31. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3218 (2010).
32. Id. at 3227.
33. Id. at 3228.
34. Id. at 3231.
35. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
36. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
37. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
38. Id. at 3228.
39. Id. at 3230.
40. Id. at 3225.
41. MARTIN J. ADELMEN ET AL., PATENT LAW IN A NUT SHELL 1 (Thomson/West 2008).
42. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 968 (2008) (Dyk, J., concurring).
43. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3242 (Stevens, J., concurring). At the Constitutional Convention, the
clause granting patent powers to Congress was passed without objection. Id. Justice Stevens
noted this pass without objection is striking because other proposed powers of Congress, such as
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The United States Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”44 The preceding provision has given rise to both United
States patent statutes and copyright statutes.45 In 1790, Congress utilized
the power given by the Constitution and enacted the first Patent Act.46 The
Patent Act of 1790 permitted patents of “any useful art, manufacture,
engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known
or used.”47 The requirements for patent eligibility in the Patent Act of 1790
were largely based on features of the English patent system and reflected
the English approach to patent eligibility at that time.48
Amended in 1973, the 1790 Patent Act became the basis for current
patent law in the United States.49 The relevant section of the 1793 Patent
Act to determine patent eligibility “stated a patent may be granted to any
person or persons who ‘shall allege that he or they have invented any new
and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition
of matter.’”50 The language for determining patent eligibility of the 1793
Patent Act remained relatively unchanged until 1952, when the term “art”

the power to grant charters of incorporation, generated discussion about the fear of monopolies.
Id. Some scholars suggest the passing of the clause granting patent power was without objection
because of past experience with the English patent system. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System
Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 585 (1999) (discussing patent officers, judges, legislators,
and inventors understood what patents were meant to protect); see also Graham v. John Deere Co.
of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (discussing Thomas Jefferson’s observations about the scope of
patentable subject matter).
44. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
45. ARTHUR H. SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (A.L.I. 1956). The patent statutes are within title 35 of the United
States Code, and the copyright statutes are within title 17 of the United States Code. Id.
46. ADELMEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 19. See generally 1790 Patent Act, ch. 11, § 1, 1
Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-105 (2006)).
47. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 967 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring) (quoting 1790
Patent Act, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-105)).
48. Id. at 967.
49. Id. at 966.
50. Id. (quoting 1793 Patent Act, ch. 11, § 1 Stat. 318, 319 § 1 (1793) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-105)). Discussing the similarities between the 1793 Patent Act and English
patent law, Judge Dyk noted:
Each of the five categories of patentable subject matter recognized by the 1793 Patent
Act—(1) “manufacture,” (2) “machine,” (3) “composition of matter,” (4) “any new
and useful improvement,” and (5) “art”—was drawn from the Statute of Monopolies
and the common law refinement of its interpretation or resolved competing views
being debated in England at the time.
Id. at 968-69.

2010]

CASE COMMENT

649

was replaced with the term “process,” in § 101, with § 100(b) providing a
definition of “process.”51
The current language of the Patent Act, in § 101, defines subject matter
that may be patented: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”52 This section specifically provides four independent categories of inventions which are eligible for patent: (1) processes, (2) machines, (3) manufacturers, and (4) compositions
of matter.53 The term “process,” as used in § 101, is defined in § 100(b) as
a “process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”54 Determining
the patent eligibility of a claimed process requires statutory interpretation
beyond the definition in § 100(b).55
B. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Congress created the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in 1982 to
address a lack of uniformity in the application of patent law and to increase
predictability of patent cases.56 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals “consolidated all patent appeals from district courts across the country in a
single court with exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over patent appeals
from district courts and the [United States] Patent [and Trademark]
Office.”57 Thus, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals is the exclusive
appellate court for patent law cases after the administrative process.58 In
South Corp. v. United States,59 the Federal Circuit adopted the decisions of
its predecessor court, the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, as precedent.60

51. Id. at 966; see 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b), 101.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 101. The language “subject to the conditions and requirements of this title”
of § 101 includes fulfilling the requirements of novelty in § 102, nonobviousness in § 103, and a
full and particular description in § 112. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010).
53. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221. Of these four independent categories, Bilski and Warsaw’s
hedging method is categorized as a process. Id. at 3225.
54. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
55. See generally Bilski, 130 S. Ct at 3242-50 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing historical
evolution of the term process under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
56. ADELMEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 22.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
60. ADELMEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 22.
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C. DETERMINING PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF PROCESSES
In Bilski, the United States Supreme Court analyzed: (1) the patent
eligibility of processes when the claimed invention contains abstract ideas
or mathematical algorithms,61 (2) the machine-or-transformation test as the
sole test of patent eligibility under § 101,62 and (3) the categorical exclusion
of business methods as patent eligible.63 Since the 1952 amendment to the
Patent Act, both the United States Supreme Court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have construed the language of
§ 101 to determine patentability of processes.64 In Bilski, the Court relied
on Gottschalk v. Benson,65 Parker v. Flook,66 and Diamond v. Diehr67 to
reach the conclusion that Bilski and Warsaw’s claimed hedging method was
68
not patent eligible as a process.
In Gottschalk v. Benson, the process at issue was a method of programming a general purpose digital computer to convert signals from binarycode decimal form into pure binary form.69 The procedure used to accomplish the conversion was essentially an algorithm.70 The method of
conversion did not need to be completed on a particular computer and could
even be performed without a computer.71 Thus, the method sought to be
patented was essentially a patent of the algorithm itself.72 Because granting
a patent for the method claimed in Benson would “wholly pre-empt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the
algorithm,” the Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and refused to grant a patent.73 The Court further concluded the decision did “not
hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of [being tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to
change articles or materials to a different state or thing].”74 Instead,
61. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010).
62. Id. at 3227.
63. Id. at 3228.
64. Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, Construction and Application of Patent Act—United
States Supreme Court Cases, 27 A.L.R. FED. 2d 151, 169-70 (2010).
65. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
66. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
67. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
68. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
69. Benson, 409 U.S. at 73.
70. Id. at 65.
71. Id. at 67.
72. Id. at 71-72.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 71. The Court examined precedent for the proposition that a tie to a particular
machine or an operation to change articles or material to a different state or thing has been suggested for patent eligibility of a process. Id. at 68-70. See, e.g., The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1,
572-73 (1888) (holding the claim patent-eligible because it was for the use of electricity both for
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“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article to a different state or thing is
the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.”75
In Parker v. Flook, the Court considered “whether the identification of
a limited category of useful, though conventional, post-solution applications
of [a novel and useful mathematical] formula makes [a] method eligible for
patent protection.”76 The claimed method in Flook was one that updated
alarm limits during catalytic conversion processes.77 The only difference
between conventional methods of changing alarm limits and the method at
issue was the use of a mathematical algorithm to calculate an updated
alarm-limit value.78 The Flook Court held the process was not patent eligible under § 101, “not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one
component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the
prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable
invention.”79 The Court further noted the discovery of a mathematical formula or phenomenon of nature cannot support a patent unless there is some
other inventive concept in its application.80 In Benson, the Court similarly
noted “[p]henomena of nature . . . mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific
and technological work.”81
Relying on its decisions in Benson and Flook, the Court affirmed the
patent eligibility of a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber
into cured precision products in Diamond v. Diehr.82 In Diehr, the Court
explained the nature of patentable processes, deferring to the language of
Cochrane v. Deener,83 as not dependent on a particular form of instrumentalities, but requiring that certain things be done to certain substances in a
certain order, with the instruments to be used to complete such a process as

the magneto and variable resistance methods and was not one for all telephonic use of electricity);
Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1854) (stating “chemical process or physical acts which
transform raw materials are . . . sufficiently definite to confine the patent monopoly within rather
definite bounds”); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1877) (noting “a process may be
patentable, irrespective of the particular form of the instrumentalities used . . . if the patent is not
confined to [a] particular tool or machine, the use of others would be an infringement, the general
process being the same”).
75. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70.
76. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 585-86.
79. Id. at 594.
80. Id.
81. Gottschaltz v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
82. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
83. 94 U.S. 780 (1877).
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secondary.84 Further, the Court noted an addition was made to this definition of a patentable process in Benson.85 Although the process at issue in
Diehr was dependent on an algorithm, similar to the inventions at issue in
Benson and Flook, the Court concluded the claimed process was patent
eligible because the process involved the transformation of raw, uncured
synthetic rubber into a different article.86 The inclusion of an algorithm did
not pre-empt a claimed process from patent eligibility.87 Unlike the processes at issue in Benson and Flook, the process at issue in Diehr was an
attempt to receive patent protection for a process of curing synthetic
rubber.88
III. ANALYSIS
The issue presented in Bilski turned on “whether a patent can be issued
for a claimed invention designed for the business world.”89 To determine
whether Bilski and Warsaw’s invention was eligible for patent, the Court
needed to decide whether the machine-or-transformation test was the sole
test for determining the patent eligibility of a process under the Patent
Act.90 The Court addressed three main arguments the government offered
to support the conclusion the invention in question was not patent eligible:
84. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184. Specifically, the Deener Court explained the nature of a
patentable process:
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed . . . . A process is a mode of treatment of certain
materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the
subject matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and
useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent
law, it is an art. The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the process may or
may not be patentable; whilst the process itself may be altogether new, and produce an
entirely new result. The process requires that certain things should be done with certain substances, and in certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this may be of a
secondary consequence.
Deener, 94 U.S. at 787-88. Although the term “process” was not added to 35 U.S.C. § 101 until
1952, a “process” received patent protection prior to 1952 because it was considered a form of
“art,” which was the term in the 1793 Patent Act. See Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267-68
(1854).
85. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184. In Benson, when the Court described the nature of patent
eligibility of processes, it added the transformation and reduction of an article to a different state
or things is the clue to patent eligibility of a process that does not include a particular machine.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 70.
86. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184.
87. Id. at 185. In Parker v. Flook, the Court also stated “a process is not unpatentable simply
because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm.” Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
590 (1978).
88. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
89. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).
90. Id. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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(1) the hedging method did not meet the requirements of the machine-ortransformation test and thus was not patent eligible as a process, (2) the
hedging method was a method for conducting business and thus was not
patent eligible because business methods are precluded from patent eligibility as processes, and (3) the hedging method was not patent eligible because
it was an abstract idea.91
The Court held the machine-or-transformation test is a “useful test and
important clue for determining whether a claimed invention is a process
within § 101, but it is not the sole test.”92 The Court also concluded business methods are not categorically excluded from patent eligibility as
processes.93 The Court further held the claims of Bilski and Warsaw’s
hedging method were, nonetheless, an abstract idea and not patent eligible
under § 101.94 Therefore, the Court affirmed the court of appeal’s decision
rejecting Bilski and Warsaw’s patent application.95
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in Bilski, in which
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito joined in full and
Justice Scalia joined in part.96 The majority opinion addressed the
machine-or-transformation test for patent eligibility of a process,97 the business methods exclusion from patent eligibility,98 and the patent eligibility of
abstract ideas.99
1.

The Machine-or-Transformation Test

The Court first considered whether an invention was required to be tied
to a machine or transform an article to be a patent eligible process under
§ 101.100 To determine whether the machine-or-transformation test was the
sole test for patent eligibility of a process, the Court looked to the statutory
language and the principles of statutory interpretation.101 For statutory
91. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223-24. See also Brief for Respondent at 8-10, Bilski, 130 S. Ct.
3218 (No. 08-964) (discussing the arguments presented to the Court).
92. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
93. Id. at 3228.
94. Id. at 3231.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 3223.
97. Id. at 3226-28.
98. Id. at 3228-29.
99. Id. at 3229-30.
100. Id. at 3225. Under the appellate court’s formulation, a process is only patent eligible
under § 101 if it is “tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or it transforms a particular article
into a different state or thing.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
101. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226.
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construction, unless otherwise defined, “words will be interpreted as taking
their ordinary, contemporary common meaning.”102 The Patent Act explicitly defines the term “process” in § 100(b) as a “process, art or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or material.”103 The definition of process provided in § 100(b)
applies to the term “process” in § 101.104 The Court stated it was unaware
of any ordinary, contemporary common meaning of “process, art or
method”105 as used in the definition of process in § 100(b) that confined
these terms to be tied to a machine or transformation of an article.106 Thus,
adopting the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test of patent
eligibility for processes in § 101 would violate statutory interpretation
principles.107 The Court further stated the doctrine of noscitur a sociis was
inapplicable because § 100(b) explicitly defined the term “process,” and
there was no need to look to other patent eligible categories of § 101 to
determine the confines of “process” in § 101.108 Consistent with the
principles of statutory interpretation, the Court held the court of appeals
incorrectly decided the exclusive test of patent eligibility for a process was
the machine-or-transformation test.109
The machine-or-transformation test is one test to determine whether a
process is patent eligible, but it was not intended to be the exclusive test.110
The Court reinforced that the machine-or-transformation test is not the exclusive test of patent eligibility of processes by relying on the reasoning of
the Benson and Flook Courts.111 In Benson, the Court specifically stated
“transformation and reduction of an article to a different state or thing is the
clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular
machines,”112 but declined to hold an invention would not be patent eligible
102. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S.
37, 42 (1979)).
103. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
107. Id.
108. Id. Noscitur a sociis is “a canon of construction holding that the meaning of an unclear
word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1160-61 (9th ed. 2009); see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588
(2010) (applying noscitur a sociis to give an ambiguous term more precise content by neighboring
words with which the word was associated). Respondents urged the Court to look to the three
other patent eligible categories in § 101—machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter—
to confine the meaning of “process” by requiring a tie to a machine or transformation. Bilski, 130
S. Ct. at 3226.
109. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 3226-27.
112. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
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if the claimed process was not able to meet the machine-or-transformation
test.113 In Flook, the Court took a similar approach, holding a process may
be patented even if it is not tied to a machine or does not transform a particular article.114 Thus, the Flook Court concluded “precedents establish the
machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes
under § 101.”115
2.

Patent Eligibility of Business Methods

The Court next considered whether there was a categorical exclusion of
business method patents as “processes” under § 101.116 Again, the Court
relied on principles of statutory interpretation to conclude there was no
broad categorical exclusion of business methods as patent eligible.117 The
term “method” is used in the definition of “process” within § 100(b).118
Because “method” within § 100(b) is not defined, the Court looked to the
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of the term.119 The Court stated
it was unaware of any ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of
“method” that excluded business methods and defined method as “an
orderly procedure or process . . . regular way or manner of doing anything;
hence, a set form of procedure adopted in investigation or instruction.”120
The Court continued by stating the categorical exclusion of business
methods in the scope of § 101, which the Secretary of Commerce of
Intellectual Property urged, would undermine the Patent Act because the
Act specifically contemplated the existence of business method patents.121
Under § 273(b)(1), a defense of prior use is provided against claims of
alleged patent infringement.122 For purposes of the defense in § 273(b)(1),
113. Id. at 71 (“We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the
requirements of our prior precedents.”). See Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935), and Waxham v.
Smith, 294 U.S. 20 (1935), for additional discussion on patent eligibility of processes that are not
tied to machines.
114. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 & n.9 (1978).
115. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
116. Id. at 3228.
117. Id. at 3228-29.
118. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006) (defining process as “process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material”).
119. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S.
37, 42 (1979)).
120. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1548 (2d ed. 1934)).
121. Id.
122. Id. The defense of prior use to an alleged patent infringement provides:
It shall be a defense to an action for infringement under section 271 of this title . . .
with respect to any subject matter that would otherwise infringe one or more claims
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the term “method” includes “a method of doing or conducting business.”123
The Court interpreted the scope of § 101 in light of the reference to “doing
and conducting business” within § 273 and concluded the exclusion of business methods as patent eligible would render § 273 meaningless.124 Further, the Court held § 273 supported the understanding that a business
method is one type of patent eligible method under § 101.125
The categorical exclusion of business method patents as processes
under § 101 would violate the principle against interpreting a statutory provision so as to render another provision superfluous.126 While statutory
interpretation principles allow for the possibility of some business method
patents, the Court did not suggest all business methods are patent eligible,
nor did the Court suggest the “broad patentability of business method inventions.”127 Thus, the Court concluded there was no categorical exclusion
of business method patents as patent eligible “processes” under § 101 and
the claimed hedging method in Bilski and Warsaw’s patent application was
not categorically outside the scope of § 101.128
3.

Patent Eligibility of Abstract Ideas as Processes

The Court held Bilski and Warsaw’s patent application was not outside
the scope of § 101 because the hedging method did not meet the machineor-transformation test, and it could not be rejected categorically as the
method results in a business method process.129 Nonetheless, the Court
concluded the examiner did not err in rejecting the patent application
because the claimed process was an abstract idea.130 Instead of “adopting
for a method in the patent being asserted against a person, if such person had, acting in
good faith, actually reduced the subject matter to practice at least 1 year before the
effective filing date of such patent, and commercially used the subject matter before
the effective filing date of such patent.
35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1).
123. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228. The term “method” as used in § 273(b)(1) “means a method
of doing or conducting business.” 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3).
124. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228.
125. Id. Specifically, the Court concluded:
By allowing [the defense in § 273,] the statute itself acknowledges that there may be
business method patents. Section 273’s definition of “method,” to be sure, cannot
change the meaning of a prior-enacted statute. But what § 273 does is clarify the
understanding that a business method is simply one kind of “method” that is, at least
in some circumstances, eligible for patenting under § 101. A conclusion that business
methods are not patentable in any circumstance would render § 273 meaningless.
Id.
126. Id. (citing Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1566 (2009)).
127. Id. at 3229.
128. Id. at 3230.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 3231.
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categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts[,]”
the Court narrowly decided the outcome of Bilski on the basis of the Court’s
earlier decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.131
Three specific exceptions exist to the broad patent eligibility principles
of § 101: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”132 The
three exceptions are not required by the statutory language of § 101, but
they are consistent with the requirement that a process must be new and
useful to be patentable.133 In Benson, the Court explained “a principle, in
the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim either of them an exclusive right.”134
Granting a patent for the invention at issue in Benson would have resulted
in patenting an idea, “wholly pre-empt[ing] the mathematical formula involved and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”135
In Flook, the Court held a process was not eligible for patent protection
because the only innovation was reliance on a mathematical algorithm.136
Unlike the algorithm in Benson, the algorithm in Flook was limited because
it could be freely used outside the petrochemical and oil refining industries,
but the Court rejected the application as a post-solution activity, which, no
matter how conventional or obvious in itself, could not transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.137
Similar to the use of an algorithm in the process at issue in Benson, the
hedging process in Bilski and Warsaw’s application could be reduced to a
pure mathematical formula, an abstract idea and therefore not patent eligible.138 Allowing patent protection for Bilski and Warsaw’s claims one and
four would “pre-empt use of this approach in all fields,” just as granting a
patent in Benson would have achieved.139 Similar to the claims in Flook,
the remaining claims of Bilski and Warsaw’s application were essentially
post-solution tokens that attempted to patent the abstract idea of hedging

131. Id. at 3229.
132. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584, 594 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
133. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
134. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
135. Id. at 72.
136. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585-86.
137. Id. at 590.
138. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
139. Id. Claim four of Bilski and Warsaw’s patent application reduced claim one to a mathematical formula. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 8. The remaining claims of the application
were dependant on the mathematical formula articulated in claim four. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3224.
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risk.140 Bilski and Warsaw’s patent application was rejected under the
Court’s precedents on “the unpatentability of abstract ideas.”141 For a
definition of a patent eligible process, no further guidance was required of
the Court beyond Benson, Flook, Diehr, and the definition within § 100.142
Thus, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal’s decision rejecting patent protection for Bilski and Warsaw’s hedging method.143
B. CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE STEVENS
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, holding the claimed process
was not patent eligible, but authored a separate opinion in which Justice
Ginsberg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor joined.144 Justice Stevens
suggested the majority opinion was too broad because the issue could have
been resolved narrowly by holding “that although the machine-or-transformation test is reliable in most cases, it is not the exclusive test.”145 Justice
Stevens disagreed with the majority’s inclusion of business methods as
patent eligible, and he stated business methods have historically been outside of the subject matter to receive patent protection,146 outside the definition of “process” in § 101, and not intended for patent protection.147 Further, Justice Stevens suggested the inclusion of business methods as patent
eligible processes under § 101 may inhibit innovation, when encouraging
innovation is at the premise of patent protection.148
In his opinion, Justice Stevens heavily critiqued the majority’s statutory
interpretation of “process” within § 100(b).149 Relying on the Flook
Court’s language, Justice Stevens stated within § 101, the term “process”
did not refer to the ordinary usage of the term.150 Justice Stevens stated the
140. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. The claimed invention in Flook was possibly more tangible
than the method of hedging because the Flook invention “was at least directed to a narrower
domain of signaling dangers in operating a catalytic converter.” Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 3231-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 3239 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)).
147. Id. at 3238. The majority’s statutory interpretations using the ordinary, contemporary,
and common meaning of process ignores the well-settle proposition that “process” in § 101 is not
a process in the ordinary sense of the word. Id. (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 588).
148. Id. at 3253.
149. Id. at 3237. Justice Stevens noted the definition of “process” in § 100(b) was not
helpful because it contained the terms “process” and was circular. Id.
150. Id. (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 588) (stating the discovery of the method in Gottschalk v.
Benson forecloses a purely literal reading of § 101). However, the Flook Court noted the statutory
definition of “process” was broad and has been restricted by the recognition of a process as patent
eligible when it was “tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change materials to a different
state or thing.” Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 n. 9.
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Court made a “serious interpretive error” when it abandoned the wellsettled proposition that the term “process” in §101 is not a process in the
ordinary sense of the word, as the term process was used within the 1952
Patent Act.151 According to Justice Stevens, the majority erred when it
interpreted the term “process” with its ordinary, contemporary common
meaning and ignored the “complex terms of art developed against a
particular historical background.”152 Justice Stevens found the majority’s
interpretation incredible because the Court had previously deviated from
interpreting “process” in § 101 with its ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.153
Opposed to the majority opinion, Justice Stevens further concluded
business methods were not eligible for patent protection.154 Justice Stevens
noted American patent law was largely founded on the English patent
system155 and stated there was no basis from the text of the Statute of
Monopolies or the English common law prior to 1790 to infer a business
method was eligible for patent protection.156 Further, when English patent
law was integrated into American law through the Constitution, there was
little debate about the scope of patentable subject matter because legislators,
courts, and patent officers knew machines and manufactures were at the
core of the patent system.157 Justice Stevens noted from 1790 to 1952, the
Court never addressed the patentability of business methods and consistently focused on whether the invention was connected with a machine or
physical transformation.158 In 1952, when the Patent Act was amended and
the term “process” replaced the term “art,” the intent was not to expand the
subject matter that was patent eligible, but instead to codify the courts’
interpretation of “art” as process and method.159 Justice Stevens suggested
the 1952 Patent Act appeared to codify the “conclusion that subject matter
which was understood not to be patentable in 1952 was to remain unpatent-

151. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 3238-39; see Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 (noting the discovery of the method in
Benson “foreclose[d] a purely literal reading of § 101”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185
(1981) (holding claims that are close to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are
not processes under § 101 even if they could be described as a process in the ordinary sense of the
word).
154. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3239 (Stevens, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 3239 (citing E. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS:
AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1789–1836, 109 (1998)).
156. Id. at 3240 n. 10.
157. Id. at 3245; see also discussion supra Part III.A (discussing constitutional and statutory
language).
158. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3246 n.33 (Stevens, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 3247.
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able.”160 Recent case law reinforces Justice Stevens’ view that business
methods are not patent eligible as processes under § 101 because the Court
has never ruled on whether the 1952 Patent Act authorizes patents on
business methods.161 Further, the Court has expressed significant doubt on
the patent eligibility of business methods because the Court gives substantial weight to the machine-or-transformation test, which business methods
162
generally do not pass.
C. CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE BREYER
Justice Breyer also authored a separate concurring opinion, in which
Justice Scalia joined in part.163 Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Stevens
that generally, methods of engaging in business transactions are not patentable processes, and Bilski should have been decided on those grounds.164
Most importantly, Justice Breyer noted, in deciding the machine-ortransformation test was not the sole test of patent eligibility for processes,
the Court did not indicate anything that produced a useful, concrete, and
tangible result was patentable.165
IV. IMPACT
The decision in Bilski will ultimately affect a boundless number of
industries, specifically “the patentability of software, advanced diagnostic
medicine techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data
compression, and the manipulation of digital signals.”166 The number of
amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in support of either peti-

160. Id. at 3249.
161. Id. (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
162. Id. The court has:
[N]ever ruled on whether [the 1952] Act authorizes patents on business methods. But
[the Court has] cast significant doubt on that proposition by giving substantial weight
to the machine-or-transformation test, as general methods of doing business do not
pass that test. And more recently, Members of this Court have noted that patents on
business methods are of “suspect validity.”
Id.
163. Id. at 3257 (Breyer, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 3257-58.
165. Id. at 3259. In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held an invention as patent eligible because it produced a “useful, concrete and tangible result.” State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). As the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals explained in In re
Bilski, the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test is applicable to claims drawn from machines,
not processes. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959-60 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
166. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (referencing several amicus briefs that were submitted).
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tioner, respondent, or neither party is evidence of the pervasive effect the
decision will have on industry, old and new.167
A. PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF BUSINESS METHODS
While the majority opinion concluded business method patents were
not excluded as a category from patent eligibility, Justices Stevens and
Breyer reached the opposite conclusion that business methods, in general,
should not be patent eligible.168 Justice Stevens relied upon the English history of patent law as it evolved into the American patent system for denying
methods of doing business as patent eligible.169 Comparably, the majority
relied on principles of statutory interpretation to reach the opposite conclusion.170
The well-reasoned dichotomy created by the Court may give rise to
uncertainty as to business method patents.171 In Justice Kennedy’s dicta, he
expressed concern that “[i]f a high enough bar is not set when considering
patent applications [of business methods], patent examiners and courts
could be flooded with claims that would put a chill on creative endeavor
and dynamic change.”172 However, Justice Kennedy noted technology and
innovations progress in unexpected ways, and this does not mean new technology is never patent eligible.173 Of course, business method patents are
still “subject to the conditions and requirements of this title[,]”174 and there
are safeguards against non-deserving business method patents, such as novelty within § 102, nonobviousness within § 103, and the need for a full and
particular description within § 112.175 Also, concerns about granting
patents to any form of human activity as a process can, as the majority
suggested, be restrained by the requirements of § 101 itself.176 These
167. See Preview of the United States Supreme Court Cases, Briefs November Cases 20092010 Term, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/
nov09.shtml#08964 (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). Sixty-eight amicus briefs were submitted to the
Court from: states; universities; members of software, biotechnology, energy, and environmental
industries; and professional associations. Id.
168. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228, 3239, 3258. See generally discussion supra Part III
(discussing the Bilski Court’s analysis).
169. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3239-42.
170. Id. at 3228.
171. Id. at 3229.
172. Id. (Justice Scalia did not join the majority opinion in relevant part, creating a plurality
opinion).
173. Id. at 3227. Justice Kennedy noted “well-established principles of patent law probably
would have prevented the issuance of a valid patent on almost any conceivable computer
program.” Id. (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
174. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
175. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 112; see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229.
176. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
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constraints are in place to ensure patents are only awarded to deserving
inventions so as to further the purpose of the Patent Act, which is to foster
innovation.177
The purpose of patent protection is to promote innovation.178 The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”179 For businesses, the market promotes innovation, and in applying Bilski, courts will
need to find a happy medium so as not to impede the “Progress of . . .
useful Arts.”180 Justice Stevens stated companies have incentive within a
competitive market to develop business methods without patent protection,
and some business methods can be protected under an umbrella of trade
secrets.181 However, the Court left the task of balancing the scales of
promoting and stifling innovation to the Federal Circuit Court when the
Supreme Court urged the Federal Circuit to determine limiting criteria on
the patent eligibility of processes that promote the purposes of the Patent
Act.182 Through the Federal Circuit’s future decisions, the court must
develop limitations on patent eligibility of business methods as processes.
The task assigned to the Federal Circuit is a difficult one, and the U.S.
Supreme Court previously “thought [the Federal Circuit] needed to make
the machine-or-transformation test exclusive precisely because its case law
had not adequately identified less extreme means of restricting business
method patents.”183
B. REMAND OF CASES IN LIGHT OF BILSKI
The day following the Bilski decision, the Court granted certiorari for
two cases, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC184 and Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.185 Both cases
were remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal

177. Id.
178. Id. at 3257 (Stevens, J., concurring).
179. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
180. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing how patents can discourage research by impeding the free
exchange of information).
181. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3254 (Stevens, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 3231 (“In disapproving an exclusive machine-or-transformation test, we by no
means foreclose the Federal Circuit’s development of other limiting criteria that further the purposes of the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text.”).
183. Id.
184. 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
185. 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).
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Circuit for further consideration in light of Bilski.186 These cases involve
the first application of the Bilski analysis in the Federal Circuit, which will
provide the foundation for courts’ direction determining patent eligibility of
processes.
Prior to the Bilski Court’s decision, in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc v.
Mayo Collaborative Services,187 the Federal Circuit Court held the district
court erred in finding the claimed method of medical treatment as not
patentable.188 On remand and in light of Bilski, the Federal Circuit again
ruled the district court erred.189 The decisions of the Federal Circuit in
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. were determined based on the machine-ortransformation test of patent eligibility for processes.190 The Federal
Circuit noted the Bilksi decision “did not undermine our preemption
analysis of Prometheus’s claims [when] it rejected the machine-ortransformation test only as a definitive test.”191 However, the Federal
Circuit further rejected Mayo’s contention that the machine-ortransformation test was not determinative of patent eligibility.192 Because
the method of medical treatment at issue in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
satisfied the machine-or-transformation test, the Federal Circuit did not
further determine any limitations of processes that do not meet the machineor-transformation test.193 On remand, the Federal Circuit’s decision of
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. will clarify the patentability of those
processes that do not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test. In the
Federal Circuit’s previous ruling in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., the
process at issue was not patent eligible because it did not satisfy the
machine-or-transformation test.194
C. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE PROCEDURES
The United States Patent and Trade Office was organized to create an
efficient system of reviewing patent applications.195 When a patent
application is rejected by a USPTO examiner, the USPTO issues an Office

186.
187.
188.
189.
2010).
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
2008).
195.

Classen, 130 S. Ct. at 3541; Mayo, 130 S. Ct. at 3543.
581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1339.
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1355.
Id.
Id. at 1359.
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 304 F. App’x 866, 867 (Fed. Cir.
ADELMEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 24.

664

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:641

Action with the inadequacies of the application.196 An applicant then has
up to six months to respond to the Office Action, arguing the rejection was
either factually or legally improper.197 Through this process, the USPTO
acts as a “gate-keeping” function by preventing the issuance of nondeserving patents.198 During examination, the USPTO examines the “substantive requirements of patent law: eligibility, utility, novelty, nonobviousness, adequate disclosure, and definiteness.”199 The Bilski decision
may open the flood gates for the USPTO to receive applications for process
claims, many bearing little resemblance to actual patent eligible subject
matter.200 With uncertainty as to which business methods are patent
eligible and to consideration of other possible tests of patent eligibility,
determining eligibility by examiners may not efficiently eliminate nondeserving patents.201 Without the ability to rigorously determine patent
eligibility, costs of doing business will increase from either increased litigation expenses or extracting royalty payments.202
The inclusion by the majority of business methods as patent eligible
may be a step toward patent eligibility determinations on a case-by-case
basis, as suggested by Administrative Patent Judge McQuade.203 Judge
McQuade noted, in Ex parte Bilski,204 “[The] bright line test for determining whether a claimed invention embodies statutory subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is an exercise in futility.”205 Thus, examination of
the claimed process as a whole would be a more functional approach.206
Both the majority and concurring opinions in Bilski similarly support a
holistic approach to determining patent eligibility.207

196. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2009).
197. 35 U.S.C. § 133 (2006); see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.11, 1.121.
198. ADELMEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 16.
199. Id.
200. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, at *7 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26,
2006). The Board noted the USPTO has already been flooded with process claims; many are
referred to as “business methods” and include methods of meditation, dating, and physical sports
moves. Id.
201. ADELMEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 16.
202. Id.
203. Bilski, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, at *82 (McQuade, J., concurring).
204. No. 2002-2257, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006).
205. Bilski, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, at *80.
206. Id. at *81.
207. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010). Relying on language in Diamond v.
Diehr, the Court emphasized the need to examine the claim as a whole, rather than “dissect[ing]
the claims into . . . elements in the analysis.” Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188
(1981)).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Bilski, the United States Supreme Court concluded the machine-ortransformation test was not the sole test of patent eligibility for processes
under § 101.208 The machine-or-transformation test remains a useful guide
for determining whether a process invention is eligible for patent protection,
and such determinations should be guided by the Court’s decisions in
Benson, Flook, and Diehr.209 The Court also articulated business methods
are not explicitly precluded from patent eligibility.210 The Court held Bilski
and Warsaw’s patent application was not patent eligible because the claims
attempted to patent an abstract idea.211
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